ings of Liberty Bonds. Because of its agreement with the Treasury, the Federal Reserve purchased substantial amounts of govei-nment debt.'
These purchases increased the reserves of the banking system and, consequently, the money stock; the Federal Reserve was said to have monetized the debt. In March 1951, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury reached an accor-d whereby the Federal Reserve established its independence.2 Since then, the Federal Reserve has been free to pur'sue its policy objectives independent of the debt financing needs of the 'rr'easury?
With the net federal debt (NFDI -total debt minus holdings of government agencies and tr'usts -at nearly $1.3 tr-illion arid with historically high deficits, in both nominal and r'eal terms, there is concern that the rapidly rising debt will put upward pressur'e on interest rates, inducing the Federal Reserve to in-'The Federal Reserve's holdings of government debt more than tripled from 1943 to 1946. See Historical Statistics of the United States (1975 ), p.1116 . 2 See Ahearn (1963 Actually, at a more abstract level, the question of the independence of monetary and fiscal policies is open to debate. Sargent and Wallace (1981) use the government budget constraint to argue that the monetary authority must ultimately monetize deficits, This argument has been challenged recently by Darby (1984) , and some evidence has been supplied recently by Barth, Iden and Russek (1984) . Furthermore, the budget constraint can be used to argue that the seignorage associated with Federal Reserve open market operations requires a compensatory change in government expenditures or taxes. This latter point is discussed in Horrigan (1983) . The seignorage associated with open market operations is easily illustrated from the budget constraint suggested by Thornton (1984) .
crease the monQv supply more rapidly than it otherwise would or, perhaps, should! Today, as in the immediate post-World War II period, the phrase "monetizing the debt" means money growth induced by attempts to moder'ate the effects of rapidly growing gover-nment debt on interest rates. By definition, open mar'ket operations buying and selling government securities in the money and capital markets) represent debt monetization, that is, the replacement of government debt with money. Open mar'ket purchases and debt monetization, therefore are often taken to be synonymous! This view is enhanced by the fact that open maiket operations are usually consider-ed the principal tool through which the Federal Reserve influences the money supply, so that changes in Federal Reserve policy are likely to be reflected initially in its portfolio of government debt. For these reasons, analysts sometimes look at the growth of the Federal Reserve's portfolio of government debt, the ratio of the Federal Reserve's holdings of debt IFHDI to NFD, or similar measures as indicators ofdebt monetization. These measures, however, give too little attention to the goals of policy and the nature of the money stock mechanism.' It is clear fr'om our definition that debt monetization cannot be analyzed separately from the objectives of Federal Reserve policy. Assume, for example, that the Feder'al Reserve is targeting money growth to achieve price level stability. Furthermore, assume that r'eal income is growing at a faster r'ate than velocity so that money growth must be positive. If this money growth is achieved through open market purchases of government debt while the debt is simultaneously increasing, the cor'relation between the growth in the Federal Reserve's portfolio and government debt gi'owth would give the false appearance of debt monetization. 7
In this example, debt monetization actually occurs 4 See Tatom (1984) for a historical survey of the deficit.
'In principle, any debt can be purchased. In practice, however, the Federal Reserve primarily purchases marketable debt of the U.S. Treasury.
'These measures are singled out here because they are most frequently used in the popular press. Other measures, such as growth of total reserves or the monetary base, suffer from this same deficiency, as well as some of the deficiencies noted in the following discussion. See Blinder (1983) , Dwyer (1984) and Barth, Sickles and Wiest (1982) for examples of the various measures that have been employed in empirical studies of this question. 'The astute reader will recognize that this implies that open market purchases of debt are not strictly required for debt monetization to occur. This can be argued in a number of ways. At a rudimentary level, assume that the Treasury has the power to print money, so that deficits can be financed either by issuing debt or, as a substitute, printing money. Printing money directly is as much debt moneonly if the Federal Reserve modifies its primary objective of price stability because it fears that debt growth will boost interest rates.
Fur-thermore, in order to claim that the Federal Reserve has monetized the debt, one would have to argue both that ther'e is a positive relationship between actual or anticipated interest rates and debt growth and that the Federal Reserve had modified its primary money stock growth objective in response to actual or perceived upward pressure on interest rates. In this instance, the association between the difference in the actual and targeted growth rates of money and the growth of NFD would provide evidence of debt monetization.' Thus, using the growth of Ff10 or the ratio of FF10 to NFD alone as indicators of debt monetization could be misleading. If the Federal Reserve achieves its desir'ed money gr'owth objective, it is nor monetizing the debt, even if money growth is achieved solely through open market purchases of government debt.
Alternatively, suppose the Federal Reserve's intermediate policy objective is to peg interest rates at some desired level." Then the Federal Reserve monetizes the debt only when changes in the debt, ceteris paribus, produce changes in interest rates in the same direction. That is, if increases in the debt put upward pressure on interest rates, the Federal Reserve will monetize the debt under an interest rate target.
OBSTACLES TO IDENTIFYING DEBT

MONETIZATION
In addition to the need to account for the explicit or implicit targets of monetary policy, there is another' consideration that makes the growth of FF10, the ratio tization as if debt were first issued to finance the deficit, then repurchased (later) through note issue.
Of course, the Treasury cannot issue notes directly. Indeed, the Federal Reserve cannot even purchase government debt directly from the Treasury. Consequently, all deficits must initially be financed through debt issue. This initial debt issue increases the demand for credit. If this drives interest rates upward, the Federal Reserve can lessen the effect by increasing the supply of credit, using any of its policy tools. The long-run effects of Federal Reserve activities, however, depend on the tool used due to possible wealth effects and the seignorage associated with open market operations. See Thornton.
'This does not imply that the Federal Reserve has the ability to hit its money target exactly. It requires only that there be a systematic relationship between these errors and debt growth. The identification of this process could be complicated, however, if the unintentional errors are associated directly or indirectly with debt growth.
'It is difficult to conceive of a situation in which the Federal Reserve could control interest rates in anything but the short run; nevertheless, this is a common conception of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. 
Base Growth and Debt Monetization
Other factors affect the link between adjusted base and portfolio growth and, thereby, make the connection between debt monetization and the growth of the Federal Reserve's portfolio even more tenuous. Even if the multiplier is constant, the growth rate of money need not correspond closely with growth in the Fedend Reserve's holdings of government debt.
One of these factors is changes in reserve requiremerits, such as those mandated by the Monetary Control Act of 1980. These reserve requirement changes are reflected in the reserve adjustment magnitude (RAM) ." Increases in RAM increase the base, while reductions reduce it. Consequently, changes in RAM ma cause the Federal Reserve to buy more or less government debt than it otherwise would to achieve its monetary growth objective under a monetary tar- 
An Illustration of These Relationships
The importance of these factors is illustrated in charts 1-4. Chart I shows the ratio of FH0 to NF0 annually from 1960 to 1983. This ratio increased from 1960 to 1974 and declined thereafter. Thus, generally speaking, the Federal Reserve purchased government securities at a more rapid pace than the growth of NFD up to 1974, but at a much slower pace afterwards. tf this ratio were used as the sole indicator of debt monetization, one would likely conclude that the Federal Reserve monetized the debt from 1960 to 1974, then reversed this policy.
The same conclusion would emerge if only the growth r'ate of the Federal Reserve's portfolio were considered." Yet Ml growth was about 4.8 percent during the former period and about 7.2 percent during the latter period. Thus, the growth of money was slower' in the first period than in the second, despite the fact that growth of Ff10 was faster in the first period than in the second, both in absolute terms and relative to the growth of NF0.
This inverse i-elation can be explained, in large part, by movements in the money multiplier, RAM, depository institutions' borrowings and float. These series are presented in charts 2-4.
The multiplier declined more or less steadily through 1974. Over-the same period, RAM was fairly stable, flr'st rising then dropping slightly. Borrowing was fairly stable through 1972, then increased dramatically in 1973-74. Float increased modestly through 1972, then declined by about $1 billion during 1973 and 1974. On net, a modest amount of monetary base was supplied to the banking system fiom 1960 to 1974 through bor-rowings and float, while RAM drained a modest amount of monetary base from the system over this period. With the exception of borrowings during 1973-74, however-, none of these factors was "There are other factors that affect base growth; however, quantitatively they are typically less important than those noted.
"The compounded annual rate of growth of FHD was 6.89 percent from 1974-83, compared with 8.23 percent from 1 g60-74.
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Chart I the decline in the particularly large relative to multiplier.'' Consequently, even if the policy objective had been zero money growth, the Federal Reserve still would have had to make substantial net open market purchases of government securities to offset the decline in the multiplier'. Thus, the increase in the ratio of FF10 to NF0 might reflect nothing more than the Federal Reserve's need to make purchases of government debt (to offset multiplier movements) in excess of the growth of NF0 over this period.
Ratio of Federal
After 1974, a number of factors reduced the Federal Reserve's need to engage in open market purchases. There was a significant increase in RAM through 1974-78, followed by an even more dramatic r'ise after the "For example, the multiplier declined from 3.13 in 1960 to 2.78 in 1974. Given the average level of the adjusted monetary base of $64.82 billion over this period, the decline in the multiplier had an impact equivalent to a $7.64 billion drain on the adjusted monetary base on average over this period. October 1982, the FOMC emphasized the growth of the monetary aggregates even more; however, the weight given to the various aggregates changed over this period. Consequently, it is difficult to find an extended period over which monetary polity objectives are sufficiently stable to draw strong inferences about whether the Federal Reserve has monetized the debt.
Despite these difficulties, we provide some evidence, which should be regarded as descriptive, of the relationship between money growth and debt growth during the past two and one-half decades.
The empirical investigation undertaken here differs from the usual procedure, which is to estimate a "Fed- First, many of these studies have used reserve or base growth as the monetary policy variable. Since the evidence suggests that the Federal Reserve has never targeted explicitly on these variables, changes in the growth rates ofthese variables should not be relied on to provide evidence of debt monetization.
Second, these studies include only contemporaneous values of both the monetary policy variable and the measure of federal debt growth. Since these var'iables are considered only simultaneously, it cannot be determined whether monetary growth causes debt growth or vice versa. The causation r-unning from money to debt is likely because money growth affects prices, output and nominal interest rates which, in turn, feed back to debt growth." Of course, no statistical procedure can establish causality. There is an easily implemented procedure, however, which can be used to test for the temporal ordering of two or more variables. The procedure is called a test of (iranger causality."
The Test Procedure
This test procedure can be illustrated by using the growth rate of M and NFD. Let M, and NED, denote the growth rates of money and the net federal debt, respectively, in the current period and let rCt,,Ñ ED,~,NED.,..., denote values of these variables in previous periods. The test for Gr'anger causality running from rct to NED amounts to regressing the current value of NED on past values of itself and ra, and testing the hypothesis that all of the coefficients on the past values of M are zero. To test that Granger causality runs from NED to rGt, the current value of r~iis regressed on previous values of itself and NED, and the hypothesis that the coefficients on the past values of NED are zero is tested. If the latter hypothesis is rejected, while the former is not, then it is said that growth of the NFD Granger-causes (temporally precedes) money growth. If the former is rejected, while the latter is not, then money growth is said to Grangercause ltemporal~precede) growth of the NFD. If both are rejected, no temporal ordering can be established li.e., there is feedback between rCt and NED). If neither can be rejected, the series are not temporally related (i.e., they are said to be independent;. "See Dewald (1984) , Carlson (1984) and footnote 3. " Friedman and Schwartz (1963) were among the first to try to establish the temporal ordering between macroeconomic variables. Despite its name, it is now recognized that this procedure is not literally a test of causality, nor is it a test of statistical exogeneity. See Zellner (1979) for a discussion of causality, and see Jacobs, Leamer and Ward (1979) and Wu (1983) for a discussion of the relationship between Granger causality and statistical exogeneity.
Tests of Granger causality were performed over the l/1960-IV/1983 period using two measures of debt growth that have been used in the reaction function literature. The first is the growth of NFD, discussed earlier. The second is the high-employment budget deficit (HEBDL" The deficit and changes in the NFD differ by the so-called off-budget items. These items are omitted from the official reports of the deficit, despite the fact they require debt issue.
In addition, the changes in the NFD and the HERD differ in that the latter is adjusted for cyclical factors, while the former is not. Consequently. changes in NFD may misrepresent the pressure to monetize the debt because they are not cyclically adjusted. In other words, a given change in NFD is likely to be associated with a much smaller effect on interest rates ifit occurs in the contraction rather than the expansion phase of the cycle.
Furthermore, since a relatively larger portion of deficits are cyclically induced, these cyclical influences may be dominant!' If these cyclically induced changes in debt are not associated with rising interest rates, there is no pressure to monetize the debt. Thus, because the cyclical effects have not been controlled for, there may be no temporal ordering running from NFD to money. Changes in money growth, moreover, have been shown to induce cyclical swings in economic activity, so we should not be surprised to find a strong effect running from money to income to NFD. To account for the effects of cyclical factors, lags of output growth and lags of the inflation rate are included in some of the tests of Granger causality!2
The advantage of using the HERD is that it is adjusted directly for cyclical factor's. It too may misrepresent the pressure to monetize the debt, however, because the off-budget items are omitted. Consequently, it may be significantly smaller than the amount of debt '°The data for HEBD ends in 111/1983, so the tests of Granger causality involving this variable were performed over this shorter period. Although there are other ways to carry out these tests, work by Geweke, Meese and Dent (1983) and Guilkey and Salemi (1982) indicate that the procedure used here is preferred.
"See Tatom (1984) . "Lags of past inflation are included based on the finding reported by Blinder and on the work of Horrigan and Protopapadakis (1982) and others who find that much of the measured deficits are related directly to inflation. It could also be argued that the lag from money growth to inflation is long. Therefore, the lags of past inflation may simply be a proxy for even longer lags of money growth.
In addition to NFD, a relatively new measure, the cyclically adjusted federal debt calculated by deLeeuw and Holloway (1983) , was used. The qualitative results with this variable were unchanged from those using NFD, so they are not reported here.
issue.
23 Furthermore, since the HERD is cyclically adjusted, changes in past output should not affect tests of Granger causality running from money to HERD; past changes in prices, however, may affect these tests.
Finally, because the question of debt monetization is tied closely to the policy objectives of the Federal Reserve, it is important to take account of these policy objectives. Thus, the tests of Granger causality were conducted over the entire period 111960-tII/1983 and over the subperiod ttt/1972-tlI/1983 , during which at least some consideration was given to money stock objectives." Because of the shortness of this period, it was necessary to restrict the search to six lags on each variable and to include only three lags of output growth and inflation.
Empirical Results
The Granger causality tests were performed on quarterly growth rates of Ml and NFD and on the quarterly growth rate of Ml and HERD, following a procedure outlined in Thornton and Batten (1985) ? The significance levels corresponding to the calculated F-statistics of the Granger tests are reported in tables 1-B." The significance levels are presented because the significance of the F-statistics vary with the "For example, the change in NFD in fiscal 1983 of $202.8 billion was made up of a $188.8 billion on-budget deficit and a $14.0 billion offbudget deficit. See Economic Repo,t of the President (1983) . Also, see Allen and Smith (1983) .
"The FOMC stated its desire to place increased emphasis on certain monetary aggregates at its January 1970 meeting; however, the estimation period begins in Ill/i 972 to be conservative and to allow for the six lags of both variables.
"The fact that these tests ignore the question of whether changes in the debt affect market interest rates is particularly important in interpreting the results. If changes in debt have no effect on interest rates, we should not expect to find a temporal ordering running from debt growth to money growth. If changes in debt have an effect, we may or may not find such a temporal ordering. Thus, the lack of a temporal ordering running from debt to money growth could result either from a lack of an interest rate effect or from a refusal on the part of the Federal Reserve to monetize the debt.
Furthermore, in a rational expectations view, the Federal Reserve might anticipate the deficit and increase money growth in advance of the actual increase in the debt. In this case, money growthmight precede debt growth, but we find no evidence of this temporal ordering. "Tests of Granger causality should be conducted with time series that are covariance stationary. When the autocorrelation functions of Ml, NED and HEBD were investigated, the series appeared stationary. When the Granger causality tests were undertaken including a time trend, however, the trend variable was always significant at the 5 percent level, suggesting that the series are not stationary. When the tests were performed on first differences of Ml, NED and HEBD, the time trends were uniformly insignificant. With one exception noted below, however, these results were not qualitatively different from those using the growth rates of Ml and NFD and the level of HEBD. The latter results are reported because they are easier to interpret. The significance levels based on simple bidirectional tests ofGr'anger causality between KU and NED and fCll and HERD are presented in tables 1 and 2, r-espectively. The r'esults in table 1 indicate a str'ong unidir'ectional effect running from Ku to NED. only seven ofthe 144 F-tests for the influence of NED on~li reported were significant at the 5 per'cent level. None of these seven lag structures, however, was chosen by a comnionly used lag-length specification criterion." Because NF'D is not cyclically adjusted and is likely to be affected by changes in r'eal output and prices induced by changes in the money supp~, it is not too sur'pr'ising that the teniporal or'dering runs fi'onl Ml to NED." "The lag-length selection criterion used here is the final prediction error. See Thornton and Batten, and Batten and Thornton (1984) . "It is somewhat surprising, however, that the same qualitative result is obtained for the cyclically adjusted debt measure. This suggests the possibility that this cyclically adjusted measure does not capture all the effects of past output and price level growth. This conjecture is supported by the fact that the significance levels are greatly increased when three lags of output growth and inflation were included in these specifications. In any event, there is no evidence of a temporal ordering running from cyclically adjusted debt to money. The results in table 2 for the HERD, however, mdicate unidirectional causality running from HERD to Ml. The hypothesis that HERD has no impact on Ml was rejected for nearly every lag specification considered, while the hypothesis that r~tlhas no effect on HERD was never r'ejected. Thus, this measure suggests that money gr'owth responds to cyclically adjusted changes in the debt.
The Granger Tests Extended for Cyclical Influences
In the simple tests of bivariate Granger causality pr'esented above, the observed feedback between money growth and NED or' the causality running from HERD to K41 could be the result of the close association between these variables and factors not accounted for by the equation. In order to guard against this possibility, the tests were repeated adding three and then six lags of the growth rates of prices and real output as additional variables."
The results for the equations with six lags are presented in tables 3 and 4. The results in table S indicate "The possibility that money growth responds to either past output growth or inflation can be argued two ways. First, such variables could represent a Federal Reserve reaction function response, e.g., high past rates of inflation or output growth induce the Fed to slow the rate of Ml growth. Second, the money supply could be endogenous (at least over short periods oftime like a quarter), i.e., related to other variables in the system like interest rates. Since interest rates are positively related to both inflation and output growth, the money stock should move with these variables. If the second case were correct, there should be a positive relationship between past infIation and money growth; however, Blinder reports a negative relationship. We find the same result, although it is not reported here. 
>>1
that Ml and NED ar-c independent series. There rn-c just seven instances wher'e the F-tests of NEI) on~11 ar'e significant, and none of these were selected by the lag-length specification criterion." Thus, once output growth and inflation are accounted fo,-, ther-e is virtually no evidence of a separate effect of money growth on debt growth and no evidence of causality from NED to Ml.
The results in table 4 are similar to those in table 2, in that~Il has no effect on HERD, while HERD continues to Granger-cause r~ll. A comparison of tables 2 and 4, however, shows that the significance levels for "When first differences of growth rates are used, there is no area of the lag space where the hypothesis can be rejected.
the tests of the effect r'unning fi-om HERD to Ml ar-c substantially larger when gr'owth r-ates of output and pr-ices are accounted for. Nevertheless, the HERD protides some evidence of debt monetization not evident when NED is used.
Results for Ill/i 972 -IV/i 983
The results for the 111/1972-111/1983 period> in which more emphasis was placed on the monetary aggregates, ar'e reported in tables S and 6. UnIv the results with lags of inflation and output gr'owth are reported.l" These results indicate that, over this period, "When no lags of inflation and output growth are used, the results indicate unidirectional causality running from Ml to NFD and independence between Ml and HEBD.
Ku is independent of both NED and the HERD. There was no por-tion of the lag space consider'ed in which the hypotheses constituting the Granger' tests could he rejected. Hence, ther-e is no evidence of debt monetization ovet-this per-iod for' either' measure of debt growth. Thus, the HERD result, which indicates that the Federal Reserve had monetized the debt over the 1960-83 period, appear's to result from the Feder'al Reserve's interest rate tar-get procedures over nearly the first half of the period -a period when debt monetization is mor'e likely to be an inherent result of attempts to influence inter'est rates. An investigation of a period for which it is more relevant to consider the question of debt monetization yields no evidence that the Feder'al Reserve has monetized the debt.
The pur-pose of this article was to clear up confusion that often char'acterizes discussions ofdebt monetization and to provide some evidence on the question of whether the Federal Reserve has monetized the debt. Specifically, it was pointed out that the phrase monetizing the debt" means money growth in excess ofthat required to achieve some policy objective that is induced by rapid growth in the federal debt.
It was noted that the r'atio of Federal Reserve debt holdings to net federal debt, or other such measures, cannot be used alone as evidence of debt monetization. Changes in the money multiplier' and factor's that affect components of the monetary base will influence the growth of the Federal Reserve's portfolio ofgovernment securities for any given policy objective in ways that confound attempts to determine the extent of debt monetization taking place.
'Two commonly used measures of debt growth, the growth of net federal debt and the high-employment budget deficit, were used to test whether money growth precedes debt growth, or vice versa. The results for the tlt/1972-IV/1983 period, during which the Federal Reserve placed more emphasis on the monetan 1 aggregates than it had in previous years, shows no evidence of debt monetization by the Federal Reserve using either debt measure. For the entire 1960-83 period, there is evidence of debt monetization for the high-employment deficit measure, but not for growth of the net federal debt. Thus, the only evidence of debt monetization occurs during the period of interest rate targeting, when debt monetization is to be expected if increases in the federal debt put upwar'd pressure on interest rates.
The reader is cautioned, however, in that actual money growth, rather than deviations of actual from desired money growth, was used in these tests. Since the debt monetization has to do with movements away from policy objectives induced by actual or perceived pressure of rapid debt growth on interest rates, the critical implicit assumption here, and in most previous studies of debt monetization, is that actual changes in money growth proxy such movements.
